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McGreevy. New York and London: W.W. Norton
$26.95.
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INTRODUCTION

The jacket photo for John T. McGreevy's Catholicism and
American Freedom1 is striking. In the foreground, a young and
vigorous Pope John Paul II, censer in hand,2 strides across an altar
platform on the Mall in Washington, D.C. His attention is fixed off
camera, presumably at the altar he is about to reverence with incense.
At the bottom of the picture, gathered around and below the platform,
sits a grainy group of mitre-wearing bishops.3 Looming directly over
the scene, in the background yet dominating the photograph, is the
towering dome of the U.S. Capitol Building.
This picture is worth many thousand words; it evokes and captures
many of the events described, themes developed, and debates
presented in this excellent book. The crowd of faceless bishops,
lurking beneath the foundations of the Capitol, recalls the famous
Thomas Nast cartoon depicting a mass of crawling crocodile-like
prelates who, with toothy, gaping mitres, stalk Tammany-abandoned
schoolchildren cowering in the ruins of the public schools and armed
only with the Holy Bible.4 That the Church's rituals are proceeding in

* Associate Professor, Notre Dame Law School.-Ed. I am grateful to the editors and
staff of the Michigan Law Review for their help and patience, and also to many colleagues
and friends for their comments and criticism. Thanks are due, in particular, to Nicole Stelle
Garnett, Michael Scaperlanda, Eric Claeys, Greg Sisk, John Nagle, Bob Rodes, and Tom
Shaffer.

1. John T. McGreevy is the John A. O'Brien Associate Professor of History at the
University of Notre Dame.
2. A "censer " (also called a "thurible") is a bowl-like vessel, suspended from a chain,
which is used for burning incense in many Roman Catholic and other religious liturgies.
3. A "mitre " is the pointed folding-cap often worn by bishops in the Roman Catholic
and some other churches.
4. This Nast illustration, "The American River Ganges - The Priests and the Children"
(Sept. 30, 1871), is reproduced on the cover of LLOYD P. JORGENSON, THE STATE AND THE
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our most public of public squares, in the shadow of the unmistakably
churchlike seat of our national government, reminds us that our
"separation of church and state" has long been anything but strict, and
perhaps also that even our professedly secular state has at times
demanded faithlike loyalty to its own political orthodoxies.5 That the
Capitol dome so resembles that of St. Paul's Cathedral in London
highlights the tension between Catholicism and America's Protestant
origins, traditions, and premises. In the picture, the Pope occupies an
in-between place, as Catholics in America often have: he appears both
suspended and intent on mediating between the ancient, hierarchical
Church he leads and the modern, democratic nation he is addressing.
His posture is neither defensive nor defiant, but confident. It is as if his
aim is not to impose a conclusion, but to propose a claim and to
initiate a conversation.
Catholicism and American Freedom is about, and part of, that
conversation. This book is relevant and important reading for anyone
who aspires to understand American culture, history, and politics. It
should also be of particular interest to lawyers and legal scholars. And,
the book is welcome, given the appallingly widespread ignorance of
the themes and topics it explores.6
I.
John T. McGreevy is the author of Parish Boundaries: The
Catholic Encounter With Race in the Twentieth-Century Urban North,
a respected history.7 His latest book, Catholicism and American
Freedom, confirms McGreevy's skill and sensitivity. It is timely,
engaging, provocative, and entertaining. It is carefully researched and
annotated, but never pedantic or tedious. McGreevy's prose is clear
and accessible; his tone is warm and charitable, balanced but not

NON-PUBLIC SCHOOL: 1825-1925 (1987), and is also available online at http://historyproject.
ucdavis.edu/imageapp.php?Major=RE&Minor=D.
5. See generally, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Bamette's Big Blunder, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
625 (2003).
6. It is unfortunate that not only most Americans, but probably most historians as well,
know little if anything about the conflicts and characters McGreevy portrays, other than
what they might have absorbed from films such as FAR AND AWAY (1992), THE GANGS OF
NEW YORK (2002), or ONE MAN'S HERO (1999). See, e.g., Michael J. Lacey, That Old-World
Religion, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2003, § 7, at 13 (reviewing JOHN T. MCGREEVY,
CATHOLICISM AND AMERICAN FREEDOM (2003) and noting that "most serious readers of
American history know a good deal about the Protestant past, but next to nothing about
Catholicism"). ONE MAN'S HERO (1999), an undeservedly overlooked film, is the story of
the St. Patrick's Batallion (or "San Patricios"), Irish Catholics who fled the U.S. Army
during the Mexican-American War and ended up fighting for Mexico. Many were eventually
executed as traitors.
7. JOHN T. MCGREEVY, PARISH BOUNDARIES: THE CATHOLIC ENCOUNTER WITH
RACE IN THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY URBAN NORTH (1996).
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bland. He is unobtrusive - though not disingenuously disinterested and, with only a few exceptions, steers clear of soapboxes and heavy
handed editorializing.8 His project seems not to steer, let alone drag,
his readers to particular conclusions.9 It is, instead, to call their
attention to the dynamics of a close, complicated, and continuing
relationship, one whose role in shaping Americans' arguments about
America is often overlooked.
Catholicism and American Freedom is not a "Catholic" book. It is
not a work of devotion, apologetics, or catechesis; nor is it a study of
the Catholic Church's divisions, crises, or future.10 It is not a
tendentious chronicle of Catholic misdeeds and corruption or an
overwrought pseudo-historical indictment,11 nor is it a crusading,
triumphalistic romp.12 McGreevy braves the waters of interminably
controversial matters like abortion, parochial-school vouchers, and
sexual ethics, but this work is not about these issues. He is not a
"culture warrior"13 and this book is nothing like a polemic or a
jeremiad. He calls our attention to the reality and role of anti
Catholicism in the American experience, but his book is not an
accusation or a complaint, and its concern is not with the question
whether anti-Catholicism is a persistent or spent force in American

8. Thus, this book has received generous praise in both The Nation and The New York
Times; in America and Commonweal, but also in First Things. See Neil Coughlan, The Odd
Couple, COMMONWEAL, May 9, 2003, at 26 (stating that the work is "splendid"); Lacey,
supra note 6, at 13 (stating that Catholicism and American Freedom is "brilliant"); Thomas
Murphy, A Church Aloof or Engaged?, AMERICA, July 21-28, 2003, at 27 (stating that
McGreevy provides "a vital corrective"); Richard John Neuhaus, A Continuing Survey of
Religion and Public Life: Catholics, Protestants, and the Meanings of Freedom, FIRST
THINGS, Aug./Sept. 2003, at 66, 71 (observing that McGreevy's book is a "gift" and a
"pleasure to read"); JoAnn Wypijewski, Liberal Pieties, THE NATION, Sept. 22, 2003, at 40
(calling it "fascinating" and "valuable").
9. See Wypijewski, supra note 8, at 43 ("Whatever arguments may arise for or against
liberalism or Catholicism, he leaves them largely to the reader.").
10. Cf, e.g., DAVID CARLIN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN
AMERICA (2003); DONALD B . COZZENS, SACRED SILENCE: DENIAL AND THE CRISIS IN THE
CHURCH (2002); DAVID GIBSON, THE COMING CATHOLIC CHURCH (2003); PETER
STEINFELS, A PEOPLE ADRIFT: THE CRISIS OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH IN
AMERICA (2003); JOSEPH A. VARACALLI, BRIGHT PROMISE, FAILED COMMUNITY:
CATHOLICS AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC ORDER (2000); GEORGE WEIGEL, THE
COURAGE TO BE CATHOLIC (2002); GARRY WILLS, WHY I AM A CATHOLIC (2002).

11. Cf, e.g., JAMES CARROLL, CONSTANTINE'S SWORD: THE CHURCH AND THE JEWS
(2001); JOHN CORNWELL, HITLER'S POPE (1999); DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN, A MORAL
RECKONING (2002); DAYID I. KERTZER, THE POPES AGAINST THE JEWS (2001); GARRY
WILLS, PAPAL SIN (2000). For a useful corrective to these disappointing and often reckless
works, see, for example, RONALD J. RYCHLAK, HITLER, THE WAR, AND THE POPE (2000).
12. Cf, e.g., H.W. CROCKER III, TRIUMPH: THE POWER AND THE GLORY OF THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH - A 2,000 YEAR HISTORY (2001).
-

13. Cf, e.g., JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS (1991).
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culture, law, or politics. 14 And, he concludes not with a strident call to
ideological arms, or a bullet-point litany of policy recommendations,
but with the cautious, modest suggestion that we temper our
"romantic view of individual autonomy" with a corrective
appreciation for associations, communion, and solidarity (p. 295).
McGreevy's subject, in a nutshell, is the story of how "America" or, more particularly, American liberalism15 - has reacted and
responded to Catholic claims about the nature and purpose of
"freedom," and how these claims were, in tum, shaped by
Catholicism's interactions with, internal conversations about, and
adjustments to American liberalism. This "interplay between Catholic
and American ideals of freedom" - a dynamic that "remains poorly
understood" - is the book's unifying storyline (p. 14). Thus, the
challenge for McGreevy is "to capture two traditions in motion, not
one: to explore American ideas about Catholicism along with the
predispositions (at times blinders) framing the mental landscape of
American Catholics" (p. 15). This book - like John Courtney
Murray's, more than forty years earlier - considers Americans'
efforts to work through the questions "whether Catholicism is
compatible with American democracy" and "whether American
democracy is compatible with Catholicism."16
Throughout the nineteenth century, and well into the twentieth, it
was regularly charged and widely believed by American intellectuals
and leaders that there was something un-American about
Catholicism's clergy, claims, teachings, practices, structures, traditions,
and adherents.17 For many people and for many years, the Roman
14. Cf, e.g. , PHILIP JENKINS, THE NEW ANTI-CATHOLICISM (2003); MARK S. MASSA,
ANTI-CATHOLICISM IN AMERICA (2003); ANTI-CATHOLICISM IN AMERICAN CULTURE
(Robert P. Lockwood ed., 2000).
15. "Liberalism" is, I realize, "a term so protean that it risks becoming useless." Steven
D. Smith, The Restoration of Tolerance, 78 CAL. L. REV. 305, 306 n.4 (1990). For present

purposes, the term describes "a family of political ideas and practices that emphasize the
importance of individual freedom and of preserving space for personal autonomy free from
collective control." Id.
16. JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J., WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC
REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION ix-x (1960).
17. This book's title is a play on Paul Blanshard's now-infamous but once-best-selling
work, American Freedom and Catholic Power, a sustained warning about the threat posed by
Catholicism to American ideals and values. PAUL BLANSHARD, AMERICAN FREEDOM AND
CATHOLIC POWER (1949).
There is some reason to think that Blanshard's arguments may be returning to
respectability, at least in some quarters. See, e.g., SUSAN JACOBY, FREETHINKERS: A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN SECULARISM 302 (2004) (stating that Blanshard's book had "a
refreshing integrity . . . because [it beginsJ with the premise that religious differences are as
important as religious commonalities.")
McGreevy addressed Blanshard's arguments, along with their context, genealogy, and
effects, in an earlier work. John T. McGreevy, Thinking on One's Own: Catholicism in the
American Intellectual Imagination, I928-1960, 84 J. AM. HIST. 97 (1997) [hereinafter
McGreevy, Thinking on One's Own ] .
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Catholic Church served as a foil for "American" values and ideals and vice versa. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that American
liberalism often defined and constructed itself precisely in opposition
to its image of Catholicism.18 At the same time, Catholic institutions,
practices, and beliefs developed in response to American and liberal
challenges, and American Catholics have oscillated uneasily between
sectarianism, segregation, and counter-culture, on the one hand, and
engagement, accommodation, and assimilation, on the other.19
Thus, American liberals often wondered with John Adams
whether "a free government [can] possibly exist with a Roman
Catholic Religion."20 In turn, many Catholics in America responded to
liberal anti-clericalism and nationalism by "defin[ing] themselves
against dominant ideas of freedom [and] individual autonomy" (p. 13),
while others followed Tocqueville in regarding "Catholicism [as] a
powerful contributor to the 'maintenance of a Democratic Republic in
the United States.' "21 And while many intellectuals charged that
Catholicism was un-American to the extent it rejected, or was
incompatible with, Americans' individualistic understandings of
"freedom," underappreciated but enormously significant American
figures such as Orestes Brownson, John Ryan, and John Courtney
Murray contended not only that Catholicism was consonant with the
best of American traditions, it might best embody and transmit
America's founding values.22 Echoing Archbishop John Purcell's 1863
case for the "moral necessity of emancipation" (p. 82), they insisted
that " [t]he Catholic Church has ever been the friend of human
freedom[,] [because] [i]t was Christ's mission to set men free. "23
18. P. 168 ("[D]iscussion of Catholicism, along with criticism of racial segregation and
opposition to fascism and communism, helped define the terms of post-war American
liberalism. ").
19. For further exploration of this dynamic, see generally, for example , JAY P. DOLAN,
IN SEARCH OF AN AMERICAN CATHOLICISM: A HISTORY OF RELIGION AND CULTURE IN
TENSION (2002), and JAY P. DOLAN, THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC EXPERIENCE (1985).
20. P. 33 (quoting Letter from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson (May 19, 1821), in 2
THE ADAMS-JEFFFERSON LETIERS 573 (L. Cappon ed., 1959)).
21. P. 21 (quoting ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 287 (G.
Lawrence trans. , 1988)).
22. P. 21 (noting that Alexis de Tocqueville "convinced himself that he had discovered a
new Catholic style, terming Catholicism a powerful contributor to the 'maintenance of a
Democratic Republic in the United States' ); see also, e.g., Orestes Brownson, Catholicity
Necessary to Sustain Popular Liberty (October 1845) ("The thesis we propose to maintain is,
therefore, that without the Roman Catholic religion it is impossible to preserve a democratic
government, and secure its free, orderly, and wholesome action. "), available at http://www.
catholicism.org/pages/liberty.htm (last visited Aug. 18, 2004); MURRAY, supra note 16, at 41
("Catholic participation in the American consensus has been full and free . . . because the
contents of this consensus . . . approve themselves to the Catholic intelligence and
conscience . . . . The ideas expressed are native to his own universe of discourse. ").
"

23. P. 83 (quoting A rchbishop Purcell's Lecture at Mozard Hall Last Sunday Nov. 1 ,
CATH. TELEGRAPH, Nov. 4, 1863, at 860).
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One particularly effective feature of McGreevy's guided tour
through the Catholic-American dialogue is the way he frames his story
around particular, noteworthy participants. Take, for example, the
muscular anti-liberalism of the nineteenth century's simultaneously
self-confident and reactionary Catholic revival: McGreevy explores it
through the exploits and arguments of the charismatic and
confrontational Jesuit, Fr. Bernadine Wiget, who worked in Boston's
North End and was a refugee from the anticlericalism then sweeping
across Europe. Similarly, the arc of Orestes Brownson's dauntingly
prolific career tracks the efforts of mid-century Catholics in America
who opposed slavery and secession, but also perceived liberal
revolution, nationalism, and individualism as threats to authentic
human freedom. Brownson was determined to resist the common
assumption of liberals and Catholic revivalists that Catholics opposed
the American experiment. 24 His work helps McGreevy to explore the
"tricornered dynamic" of "liberal intellectuals and politicians
convinced of Catholicism's hostility to freedom and progress,
ultramontane Catholics determined to resist liberalism's insistence on
individual autonomy in all spheres, and a loose assemblage of liberal
Catholics tacking between the two groups" (p. 67).25
Fr. John Ryan, a Catholic University professor, brought Catholic
thinking on solidarity and human dignity to bear on twentieth-century
labor and economic questions, but also scorned the "selfishness" of
contraception. He embodies in McGreevy's study both the
rapprochement between Catholic and liberal social reformers who
embraced economic planning, trade unionism, and Franklin Delano
Roosevelt, and the divisions to come on matters of sexual morality
and abortion (p. 158). John Courtney Murray's work illustrates the
efforts of Catholic intellectuals in the middle-twentieth century "to
move Catholic theology and philosophy toward a more nuanced
understanding of the challenges posed by modernity" (p. 191), to
retrieve a Catholic account of democracy and human rights, and to
articulate a robust, Catholic understanding of religious freedom that
avoided the errors of both nineteenth-century popes and strict
separationist Supreme Court justices.
Catholicism and American Freedom is not a work of legal theory or
an analysis of legal doctrine, but it has a lot to say about law and to
24. Brownson urged Catholic immigrants to avoid sectarian self-ghettoization, to
become "nationalized as well as naturalized, and [to] merge themselves in the great
American people. " P. 45. And, he expressed "frustration at being pinned between an 'anti
Catholic sentiment . . . shared . . . by the majority of our countrymen' and coreligionists
creating the impression that a Catholic must make 'himself a foreigner in the land of his
birth.' P. 47. For more on Brownson, see, for example, ROBERT A. HERRERA, ORESTES
BROWNSON (1999); THEODORE MAYNARD, ORESTES BROWNSON (1943); ARTHUR M.
SCHLESINGER, JR., ORESTES A. B ROWNSON (1939).
"

25. For more on ultramontane Catholics, see infra note 37.
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lawyers. It provides, for instance, the cultural background that is
essential for understanding the development and current state of the
Supreme Court's Establishment Clause doctrine. Law both follows
and shapes culture, and so it should come as no surprise that our
constitutional law concerning religious freedom has been shaped by
arguments about religion - in particular, about Roman Catholicism
- and freedom.26 This book therefore serves as a useful and worthy
companion to other recent and important works by Philip Hamburger,
John Witte, John Noonan, Steven Smith, and others.27 Similarly, the
"radical" nature of the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, and the much
remarked effects of that decision on America's political alignment and
discourse, are better understood when considered in the context of a
broader narrative about liberalism and Catholicism, autonomy and
authority.28 McGreevy's account should also enrich lawyers' studies
and conversations about education, citizenship, and loyalty.29 His history
could improve academic debates about the place of "public reason" and
religious argument in political life,30 the role of mediating associations in
constitutional law and civil society,31 and the dangers of what the Court

26. For more on the connection between arguments about Catholicism, on the one
hand, and the historical and other arguments constitutionalized by Justice Black in Everson,
on the other, see, for example, pp. 183-86; PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH
AND STATE 449-78 (2002); Thomas C. Berg, Anti-Catholicism and Modern Church-State
Relations, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 121 (2001); John Courtney Murray, Law or Prepossessions?,
14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23 (1949).
27. GERARD V. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA (1987);
DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN
CHURCH AND STATE (2002);T!MOTHY D. HALL, SEPARATING CHURCH AND STATE (1998);
HAMBURGER, supra note 26; MARK A. NOLL, AMERICA'S Goo (2002); JOHN T. NOONAN,
JR., THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE OF RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM (2000); STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE (1998); JOHN WITTE, JR.,
RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT (2000).
28. Pp. 277-78 (quoting Professor (and Judge) John T. Noonan's characterization of Roe
and its companion case, Doe v. Bolton, as the "most radical decisions ever issued by the
Court"); cf John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
29. See generally, e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE DISSENT OF THE GOVERNED: A
MEDITATION ON LAW, RELIGION, AND LOYALTY (1998); WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL
PLURALISM: THE IMPLICATIONS OF VALUE PLURALISM FOR POLITICAL THEORY AND
PRACTICE (2002); STANLEY HAUERWAS & WILLIAM H. WILLIMON, RESIDENT ALIENS:
LIFE IN THE CHRISTIAN COLONY (1989); STEPHEN MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST:
CIVIC EDUCATION IN A MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACY (2000).
30. See generally, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, UNDER Goo? RELIGIOUS FAITH AND
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2003); Michael W. McConnell, Five Reasons to Reject the Claim that
Religious Arguments Should Be Excluded from Democratic Deliberation, 1999 UTAH L.
REV. 639; Symposium, Religion in the Public Square, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 647 (2001);
Symposium, Religiously Based Morality: Its Proper Place in A merican Law and Public
Policy?, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 217-570 (2001).
31. See generally, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, The Story of Henry Adams's Soul: Education
and the Expression of Associations, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1841 (2001); John 0. McGinnis,
Reviving Tocqueville's America: The Rehnquist Court's Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90
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in Lemon v. Kurtzman called "political division along religious lines."32
He takes us to the heart of perennial questions - questions that
lawyers and legal scholars cannot and should not avoid - about the
prerogatives of the liberal state, the scope and content of religious
obligations, and even the nature and end of the human person.
II.
In the Spring of 1859 (as in the Summer of 2003), the Ten
Commandments were at center stage.33 Thomas Whall, a ten-year-old
Catholic schoolboy, was badly beaten by the assistant principal of
Boston's Eliot School, and ultimately expelled, for refusing to recite
the Commandments in their "usual form," i.e., the form recorded in
the King James Version of the Bible.34 Quickly, young Whall's "Filial
piety, manly Fortitude, and Heroic Faith Under Torture" became
more than an intramural disciplinary matter.35
Whall's parish priest - the above-mentioned Fr. Wiget challenged local Catholic boys to follow Thomas's example in resisting
"infidelity and heresy," shamed from the altar those who did not (p.
8), and publicly criticized the more conciliatory stance of his
American-born fellow priests (p. 42). The pillars of the Boston
establishment were outraged by Whall's impudence, warning that " [i]f
Protestant Christianity is to be abandoned in our public educational
system, we shall convert the schools of the Puritans into heathen
temples" (p. 9). They rallied to the "general and common doctrines of
Christianity" as a necessary defense to a "Romanism" that "allies

CAL. L. REV. 485 (2002); Robert K. Vischer, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Rethinking
the Value ofAssociations, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 949 (2004).
32. 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971).
33. On Thursday, Nov. 13, 2003, Alabama's Chief Justice Roy Moore was removed from
office by that State's judicial-ethics panel for defying a federal court order that he remove a
monument to the Ten Commandments from the rotunda of that State's courthouse. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the federal trial court's
conclusion that the installation and display of the monument violated the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause. Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2003).
34. P. 9. The "Ten Commandments" are recounted differently in a number of Christian
and Hebrew sources. Compare, e.g. , Exodus 20:1-17 (King James Version), with
Deuteronomy 5:5-21 (King James Version), and Exodus 20:1-17 (Douay-Rheims Version).
In the Catholic, Dovay version, for example, the King James prohibition on making "graven
image[s]" does not appear. As Professor Lubet has noted, this feature of the Catholic
presentation has long been a subject of anti-Catholic polemic. Steven Lubet, The Ten
Commandments in Alabama, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 471, 475-76 (1998). For a fascinating
account of the translation and production of the King James Version of the Bible that
explores, among other things, its royalist and Anglican agendas, see ADAM NICOLSON,
Goo's SECRETARIES: THE MAKING OF THE KING JAMES BIBLE (2003).
35. P. 10. This was the inscription on a goblet sent to Thomas Whall - along with other
tributes from "admiring Catholics across the country" - by the Catholic community in
Covington, Kentucky. Id.
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itself with every false and anti-republican institution which is yet
tolerated in our glorious country" (pp. 9, 11). Likewise, the trial
court in Whall's father's (unsuccessful) excessive-force lawsuit
concluded that the refusal to participate in the recitation from the
Protestant Bible threatened the good order and "stability of the public
school," "the granite foundation on which our republican form of
government rests."36
Thomas Whall's beating was not "the last gasp[] of the
Reformation"; rather, the "Eliot School Rebellion" was a "Boston
variant on a nineteenth-century struggle shaping religion and politics"
around the world {p. 12). By the same token, Fr. Wiget's belligerence
was not the idiosyncratic response of one truculent priest, but was
instead of a piece with a broader, "ultramontane"37 Catholic
"revival."38 To be sure, anti-Catholicism in America was nothing new,
and went well beyond the legal penalties imposed upon, and
disabilities endured by, Catholics in the American colonies and
states.39 From the Puritans to the Framers and beyond, anti-"popery"
was thick in the cultural air breathed by the early Americans, who
were raised on tales of Ar�nadas and Inquisitions, Puritan heroism and
Bloody Mary, Jesuit schemes and Gunpowder Plots, lecherous
confessors and baby-killing nuns.40 Thomas Paine's diagnosis would

36. P. 8 (citation omitted); see also, e.g. , John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A
Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH . L. REV . 279, 300 (2001 ) ("Catholic
students suffered beatings or expulsions for refusing to read from the Protestant Bible, and
crowds . . . rioted over whether Catholic children could be released from the classroom
during Bible reading.") (citation omitted).
37. "Ultramontane," or "beyond the mountains," in this context denotes support for
papal supremacy in the Roman Catholic Church, and is usually contrasted with "Gallican,"
which refers to a nineteenth-century movement in the Church favoring national autonomy
and restrictions on papal power. Cf pp. 12-13 (noting that "ultramontane" is "shorthand for
a cluster of shifts that included a Vatican-fostered move to Thomistic philosophy, a more
intense experiential piety . . . an international outlook suspicious of national variations with
Catholicism, and a heightened respect for church authorities . . . . "); p. 26 (describing
"Gallicanism" as "the notion that national customs might trump Roman regulations").
38. The nineteenth century Catholic "revival" was "philosophical, theological, and
organizational"; it included an emphasis on the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, on more
pietistic forms of devotion, on "Catholic parishes, schools, and organizations as refuges in an
increasingly secular, even hostile, world." P. 25.
39. See, e.g. , THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN
AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 80 (1986):
In every American colony . . . specific test laws or the possibility of being challenged to
subscribe to a test or oath of abjuration, with refusal leading to prosecution as a 'popish
recusant,' ensured the exclusion of Catholics from public life. Even more than these statutes,
a pervasive opinion that 'Popery' was synonymous with tyranny relegated Catholics to a
position beyond the realm of acceptability.
40. McGreevy has observed elsewhere that, "[i]n a certain sense . . . anti-Catholicism is
integral to the formation of the United States." John McGreevy, A History of the Culture's
Bias, Remarks at the Anti-Catholicism: The Last Acceptable Prejudice Conference (May 24,
2002). See also, e.g., RAY ALLEN BILLINGTON, THE PROTESTANT CRUSADE 1800-1860, at 1
(1938) ("Hatred of Catholics and foreigners had been steadily growing in the United States
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have enjoyed broad support when he lamented that those in the
"popish world at this day by not knowing the full manifestation of
spiritual freedom, enjoy but a shadow of political liberty."41
In the mid-nineteenth century, as waves of immigration and the
muscular claims of the Catholic revival collided with America's
nascent nationalism, long-running theological disputes became
political and cultural arguments. Liberal Protestants warned that
Jesuit refugees and other newcomers from Europe were
"indefatigable enemies of democracy and enlightenment" (p. 23) and
that Catholicism "retarded" "human progress and freedom" (p. 33),
while Catholics emphasized the dangers of an excessive and
"destructive individualism" and proposed a more "communal vision of
church, state, and society" (p. 26). McGreevy's exploration of the
"interplay between Catholic and American ideas of freedom" (p. 14)
begins with this collision, and then follows the course of the resulting
relationship through a century-and-a-half of American history.
For starters, he situates the Common School Movement in the
context of this clash between the anti-liberal understanding of
freedom embraced in the Catholic "revival," on the one hand, and the
anti-clericalism and nationalism of the mid-century revolutions, on the
other.42 The perceived excesses of these revolutions had caused many
Catholic intellectuals to "define[] themselves against dominant ideas
of freedom" and "individual autonomy" (p. 13), and to emphasize
"Catholic parishes, schools, and organizations as refuges in an
increasingly secular, even hostile, world" (p. 25). And so, as
"American liberals relied upon schools to produce citizens worthy of a
democratic republic,"43 Catholics insisted that "the work of education
[was] a principally religious work,"44 with ultramontanes like Fr.
for more than two centuries before it took political form with the Native American outburst
of the 1840's and the Know-Nothingism of the 1850's.").
41. P. 1 1 (quoting Thomas Paine, Thoughts on Defensive War, in COMMON SENSE AND
RELATED WRITINGS 68 (Thomas P. Slaughter ed., 2001)).
42. See generally, e.g. , BILLINGTON, supra note 40; CHARLES LESLIE GLENN, JR., THE
MYTH OF THE COMMON SCHOOL (1988); ROSEMARY C. SALOMONE, VISIONS OF
SCHOOLING (2000).
43. P. 38. Similarly, in Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379 (1854), another mandatoryBible-reading case, the court observed that
(l]arge masses of foreign populations are among us, weak in the midst of our strength. Mere
citizenship is of no avail, unless they imbibe the liberal spirit of our laws and institutions,
unless they become citizens in fact as well as in name. In no other way can the process of
assimilation be so readily and thoroughly accomplished as through the medium of the public
schools . . . .
Id. at 413.
44. P. 39 (quoting N.J. Perche, De / 'education, PROPAGATEUR CATHOLIQUE, Apr. 3,
1858, at 81). Cf , e.g., Pope John Paul II, Letter to Families 'II 16 (1994) (writing that the
education of children should "be considered a genuine apostolate" and that an educator is "a
person who 'begets' in a spiritual sense").
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Wiget warning that the common-school system "was the most
complete and most ingenious system that could be devised for
perverting Catholic youth."45
McGreevy turns next to slavery, abolitionism, and the Civil War,
focusing on the intra-Catholic debates about these matters,46 and also
on Catholics' more general concerns about liberal individualism and
the centralization of state power. He is therefore able to provide a new
and nuanced discussion of the antebellum role and stance of Catholics,
north and south. In particular, McGreevy reveals how " [u]neasiness
about liberal individualism proved as powerful in shaping Catholic
views on slavery as in affecting the conflict over education. "47 Like
every other religious denomination and social group, Catholics were
divided on the questions of secession, union, and abolition. Thus,
Archbishop Purcell of Cincinnati could pronounce that "Christian
people disregard [Christ's] precepts and principles and example, when
they seek to uphold or perpetuate involuntary human servitude" (p.
83; footnote omitted), while his episcopal colleague across the Ohio
River, Bishop Martin Spalding of Louisville, was no less adamant that
Republicans and abolitionists were possessed of a " 'satanic' hatred of
Catholicism" that "would soon turn against the church" (p. 87;
footnote omitted). Even Catholics who loathed slavery worried about
aligning themselves with an abolitionist movement that often "threw
Catholicism and slavery together in a completely unjust manner" (p.
78; footnote omitted), and were "sympathetic to the charge that the
nationalism of the Lincoln administration bordered on dictatorship"
(p. 73; footnote omitted).
As if to confirm liberal Catholics' antebellum worries, President
Grant warned in a famous 1875 speech to Union Army veterans that:
[I]f we are to have another contest in the near future of our national
existence, I predict that the dividing line will not be Mason and Dixon's

45. P. 42; cf, e.g., John E. Coons, School Choice as Simple Justice, FIRST THINGS, Apr.
1992, at 15, 19 ("The machinery of public monopoly was chosen specifically by brahmins . . .
to coax the children of immigrants from the religious superstitions of their barbarian
parents.").
46. For a recent discussion of similar debates in Protestant communities and traditions,
see MARK A. NOLL, AMERICA'S Goo (2002).
47. P. 49. The Catholic view on slavery and abolition "certainly included racism, but did
not wholly depend upon it." Pp. 54-55. Many Catholics "lumped immediate slave
emancipation with a religious and political radicalism that threatened the f oundations of
society." P. 56. Thus, McGreevy contends, Catholic objections to abolitionism, such as there
were, "cannot be reduced to the particular American racial dynamic. . . . This acceptance [of
slavery] rested upon the pervasive fear of liberal individualism and social disorder that so
shaped Catholic thought during the nineteenth century, along with the anti-Catholicism of
many abolitionists." P. 52.
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but between patriotism and intelligence on one side, and superstition,
ambition and ignorance on the other.48

Everyone knew what the President was talking about, and Grant's
fears tracked broader adjustments in American anti-Catholic
polemics. Increasingly, the nature, ambitions, and errors of
Catholicism were seen as political, as well as theological; they
threatened not only the conscience liberated by Luther, but also the
Nation unified by Lincoln (p. 96). The vice of Catholicism was not
simply religious heresy, but dissonance with "national organic unity".49
These concerns about unity and Catholics' objections to "the
pretensions of the modern nation-state" "collided with extraordinary
force in the discussion of public education."50 In part because of recent
cases like Mitchell v. Helms, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, and Locke v.
Davey,51 the "school wars" of the late nineteenth century are better
and more widely understood than they once were. McGreevy
advances the debate by placing controversies about the Blaine
Amendments, parochial-school funding, etc., against the backdrop of
the broader liberal-Catholic conflict, showing that " [t]he desire for a
state monopoly on education escalated in tandem with nineteenth
century nationalism throughout Europe, with schools increasingly
understood as the crucible of citizen formation" (p. 1 12).
From tension and conflict, McGreevy turns to convergence and
agreement, on policy if not on fundamental premises. With the "surge
in labor unrest," the "intensely communal and international vision
fostered by nineteenth-century ultramontane Catholics became more
appealing to a new generation of non-Catholic intellectuals and
reformers struggling to understand a society racked by poverty and
labor unrest" (p. 126). True, in many quarters, anti-Catholicism as a
social or cultural phenomenon remained as strong as ever (pp. 12425). Nonetheless, the Church-as-implacable-foe-of-modernity served
even for many of its liberal critics as a useful bulwark against socialism
48. P. 91. Similarly, after Democratic gains in the 1876 election were chalked up to "the
combined power of rebellion, catholicism, [stet.] and whiskey," James Garfield worried
about a "hard, uncomfortable struggle . . . to save the fruits of the great war." P. 93 (quoting
THEODORE CLARKE SMITH, 1 THE LIFE AND LEITERS OF JAMES ABRAM GARFIELD 613
(1925)). For more on the 1876 election, see generally ROY MORRIS, JR., FRAUD OF THE
CENTURY (2003) ; WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, CENTENNIAL CRISIS (2004); and MARK
WAHLGREN SUMMERS, RUM, ROMANISM, AND REBELLION (2000).
49. P. 101 (quoting FRANCIS LIEBER, FRAGMENTS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE ON
NATIONALISM AND INTER-NATIONALISM 12 (1868)).
50. Pp. 105, 1 12; see also, e.g. , Michael W. McConnell, The New Establishmentarianism,
75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 453, 460 (2000) (quoting testimony before Congress in 1889, by an
opponent of parochial schools, to the effect that the "task of absorbing and Americanizing
these foreign masses . . . can only be successfully overcome by a uniform system of American
schools, teaching the same political creed").
51. Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639
(2002); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
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(p. 123). On the Catholic side, the publication in 1891 of Pope Leo
XIII's encyclical, Rerum novarum - today regarded as the
fountainhead of Catholic social teaching52 _,.. confirmed Catholics'
more communal vision of society without embracing radical attacks on
private property. To be sure, the encyclical was more than a baptism
of progressive assumptions about the state, economy, and society. It
framed the reformers' questions, and the moral significance of their
ends, in a specifically Catholic vocabulary, emphasizing the primacy of
the family, the importance of mediating associations, and so on. In any
event, it appeared, in the early decades of the twentieth century, that
Catholics and Americans - progressive, liberal, right-thinking
Americans - could agree on any number of ends. The "high
point" for this new "Catholic-Liberal alliance" came with the
publication and reception in 1931 of Pope Pius Xi's Quadregesimo
anno, which emphasized the "social character" of ownership and was
hailed by President Roosevelt as "one of the greatest documents of
modern times. "53
Still, even as Catholics and liberals agreed "that the classical liberal
economic vision of a minimal state and an open economic playing field
had proved unworkable," it was clear that they "worked from starkly
different philosophical premises" (p. 138). While Catholic thinking
had been energized by Pope Leo XIII's call for a renewed emphasis
on the moral and epistemological realism of St. Thomas Aquinas,
liberals had turned instead to skepticism, pragmatism, and
empiricism.54 Moreover, a "cluster of issues" - social and moral
issues, newly ascendant - "signaled conflict" (p. 153), given that
Catholics' reservations about atomistic individualism pushed them
toward the economic reforms championed by Roosevelt, but also
toward an increasingly solitary conservatism on such matters as
divorce, censorship, and contraception. Reactions to the presidential
campaign of Al Smith and Klan-sponsored attacks on Catholic schools

52. For more on the post-Rerum novarum tradition of Catholic Social Thought, see, e.g. ,
GEORGE WEIGEL & ROBERT ROYAL, BUILDING THE FREE SOCIETY (1993); CATHOLIC
SOCIAL TEACHING (Edward P. Deberri et al. eds., 2003); ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF
CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT (John A. Coleman ed., 1993). In the Fall of 2003, the
Villanova University School of Law inaugurated a new law journal, The Journal of Catholic
Social Thought. And a number of legal scholars explore the implications of the Catholic
Social Thought tradition for legal problems at the "Mirror of Justice" web log, at http://www.
mirrorofjustice.com (last visited August 18, 2004).
53. Pp. 150, 151, 153 (citing and quoting Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno, in THE PAPAL
ENCYCLICALS, 1903-1939, at 422, 429, 430 (Claudia Carlen ed., 1981); Geza B. Grosschmid,
Pech 's Concept of the Living Wage in Quadragesimo Anno, 12 REV. Soc. ECON. 146; 1 THE
PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 778 (Samuel I. Rosenman
ed., 1938)).
54. See generally, e.g., LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB (2001) .
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confirmed the hardiness of fears about Catholics' Americanness.55 As
liberals' fears turned in the 1930s from socialism to fascism, Catholic
sympathy for Italy and Spain caused many Americans to ask again, "Is
there a Catholic problem?"56
The answer, for many prominent mid-century liberal intellectuals,
was "yes."57 Accordingly, McGreevy explores the foundations and
implications of Paul Blanshard's claim - advanced sensationally in his
bestseller, American Freedom and Catholic Power - that "the
Catholic problem is still with us," and required "resistance" to
"counter the antidemocratic social policies of the hierarchy."58 While
not "a cautious monograph," Blanshard's book "correctly assessed the
intellectual mood" (p. 166). It was not simply cranks or Protestant
doctrinal disputants who embraced Blanshard's diagnosis and
prescription - Mumford, Neibuhr, Einstein, Russell, Dewey, and
others all agreed. In sum, " [d]iscussion of Catholicism, along with
criticism of racial segregation and opposition to fascism and
communism, helped define the terms of post-war American
liberalism" (p. 168).
As McGreevy shows, the debate was as much about "America" as
it was about Catholicism.59 True, tens of thousands of Catholic soldiers
had proved their "loyalty" to America during the Second World War,
but to observe that "Catholics would remain loyal citizens was to miss
the point. Democracy was a culture, not a set of propositions.
Catholics obviously lived among Americans, but were they of them?"
(p. 169). In The New Republic's words:
[T]he real conflict is not between a Church and State or between
Catholicism and Americanism, but between a culture which is based on
absolutism and encourages obedience, uniformity and intellectual
subservience, and a culture which encourages curiosity, hypothesis, ex
perimentation, verification by facts and a consciousness of the processes
of individual and social life as opposed to conclusions about it.6()

55. See, e.g. , Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); see generally, e.g. , Stephen L.
Carter, Parents, Religion, and Schools: Reflections on Pierce, 70 Years Later, 27 SETON HALL
L. REV. 1 194 (1997).
56. P. 165 (citing Is There a Catholic Problem?, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 16, 1938, at
32-33).
57. See generally, McGreevy, Thinking on One's Own, supra note 17.
58. P. 166 (quoting BLANSHARD, supra note 17, at 9, 303).
59. P. 175 ("Defining 'Americanism' . . . was . . . the issue.").
60. P. 170 (quoting More About Catholicism and the Presidency, NEW REPUBLIC, May
11, 1927, at 315-17).
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Thus, Catholicism was again pressed into service in a "strategic,
antithetical role" for intellectuals eager to "demonstrate the non
hierarchical sources of American culture. "61
McGreevy situates the Supreme Court's landmark Everson and
McCollum decisions, and the parochial-schools debate more generally,
in the context of these concems.62 Although leading liberals had hailed
the Court's defense of non-state education in Pierce v. Society of
Sisters as an "immediate service on behalf of the essential spirit of
liberalism,"63 by mid-century many had come to regard that case as a
"dangerous inroad" on "the nation's stake in having a common
democratic education for all its children."64 Catholic schools, it was
charged, "shielded young Catholics from the democratic way of life,"65
while the public schools were celebrated by Justice Frankfurter in the
McCollum case as "the symbol of our democracy and the most
pervasive means for promoting our common destiny."66 At an even
deeper level, the parochial-schools and church-state-separation
debates were not only about American democracy, but also about the
nature of religion itself. Religion in a democracy, it was often argued,
is and must be a private matter, a product of individual choice, and the
end of an "individual quest."67 That Catholicism appeared unable, or
unwilling, to offer an account of religion and religious liberty that was
consonant with democracy and individualism made it all the more
suspect.

61. P. 175. Increasingly, it was not only the politics and structure of the Catholic Church,
but also its moral teachings on such matters as divorce and re-marriage, that were criticized
as anti-democratic. "Democracy is a penetrating principle," one writer insisted, "extending
into the most intimate relations of life . . . . Obviously, the Catholic procedure in mixed
marriages inhibits this spiritual freedom." P. 181 (quoting CHARLES CLAYTON MORRISON,
CAN PROTESTANTISM WIN AMERICA? 73-74 (1948)).
62. P. 184 (noting that much of the "voluminous" commentary "neglects to place
Everson and McCollum within the context of an ongoing discussion about Catholicism and

democracy"). My colleague Bob Rodes recalls Mark de Wolfe Howe's in-class statement
that "what you think of these cases depends on what you think of the Catholic Church."
Letter from Robert Rodes, Professor, to Richard Garnett, Professor (on file with author).
63. P. 182 (quoting Can the Supreme Court Guarantee Toleration?, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, June 17, 1925, at 85-86).
64. P. 182 (quoting MAX LERNER, NINE SCORPIONS IN A BOTTLE 195 (Richard
Cummings ed., 1994)).
65. P. 186 (quoting, inter alia, one then-prominent scholar's observation that "[y]ou
cannot practice democratic Jiving . . . in segregated [Catholic) schools") (quoting Joseph L.
Blau, Democracy and Parochial Schools, JEWISH FRONTIER, Apr. 1954, at 10, 13).
66. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.); cf, e.g.,
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 23-34 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("Our public
school, if not a product of Protestantism, at least is more consistent with it than with the
Catholic culture and scheme of values.").
67. P. 187 (quoting Agnes E. Meyer, The School, the State, and the Church, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Nov. 1948, at 45, 50).
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John Courtney Murray, Jacques Maritain, and other like-minded
thinkers worked to deflect and respond to these suspicions. The task
taken on by these mid-century Catholic intellectuals was to "bind
Catholic social thought to democracy, human rights, and religious
freedom" in a manner consistent with notions of authentic doctrinal
development,68 and to "allay doubts as to whether 'the Catholic
Church can adapt herself vitally, on principle, and not merely on
grounds of expediency, to what is valid in American democratic
development.' "69 These efforts appeared to bear fruit, with Pope Pius
XII observing, during the Second World War, that "the democratic
form of government" now appeared "as a postulate of nature imposed
by reason itself";70 with the Church's promiscuous post-war embrace
of the language of human rights;71 and with the endorsement at the
Second Vatican Council of Murray's human-dignity-based defense of
religious freedom.72 Even Paul Blanshard had to concede that
Catholicism "could no longer be described as a monolithic glacier of
reactionary thought. "73
And so, "fears among American intellectuals about Catholic
power diminished" (p. 208). As during the tum-of-the-century reform
movements, liberalism and Catholicism seemed to act in common
cause. Catholic leaders were in the "vanguard" of the fight for racial
equality and civil rights (p. 211), Catholics enthusiastically embraced
liberal anti-communism, and the public faces of American Catholicism
for Americans were Fulton Sheen and John F. Kennedy,74 not
Bernandine Wiget or Charles Coughlin. At the same time, what
Reinhold Niebuhr called the Catholics' "ridiculous prohibition of

68. P. 194; see also pp. 195-96 (discussing, inter alia, John Henry Newman's writings on
the "development of doctrine"). See generally, e.g., John T. Noonan, Jr., On the Development
of Doctrine, AMERICA, Apr. 3, 1999, at 6; JOHN HENRY CARDINAL NEWMAN, AN ESSAY
ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE (6th ed., Univ. of Notre Dame Press
1989} (1845).
69. P. 192 (quoting Joseph A. Komonchak, " The Crisis in Church-State Relationships in
the U. S. A . ": A Recently Discovered Text by John Courtney Murray, 61 REV. OF POL. 675, 692
(1999)).
70. P. 202 (quoting Pope's Christmas Message, 1944, CATHOLIC MIND 68 (Feb. 1945)).
71. Pp. 200-03. See generally, e.g. , MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW:
ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2001}.
72. See, e.g. , Second Vatican Council, Dignitatis Humanae [Declaration on Religious
Freedom] � 2 ( 1965) ("It is in accordance with their dignity as persons . . . that all men
should be at once impelled by nature and also bound by a moral obligation to seek the truth,
especially religious truth.").
73. P. 214 (quoting PAUL BLANSHARD, PAUL BLANSHARD ON VATICAN II, at x (1966)).
74. The "genuine irrelevance" of religion to Kennedy's administration made him all the
more palatable to American elites, though his "rigid distinction between religion and public
life" worried many Catholic leaders. P. 213. Senator John Kerry's 2004 presidential bid
prompted discussions about the suitability of professing Catholics for political office and the
authenticity of Kerry's Catholicism.
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contraception," and the developing clash in the abortion-rights context
between liberals' increasingly "radical defense of individual
autonomy" and Catholics' "determin[ation] to protect human life,"
pointed toward continued conflict.75
McGreevy covers in some detail both the debates within the
Catholic Church about contraception and abortion and, more
generally, the political, legal, and social developments involving these
issues. Two themes receive special emphasis. First, the Catholic
position on these and other controversial matters came to be regarded
not only as incorrect and out-of-date, but also as out ofplace in public
discourse.76 Many Catholics at mid-century were convinced that
Catholic moral realism and the Church's unbending insistence on the
"absolute inviolability of the right of an innocent human person to
life"77 had been validated and vindicated by the Second World War,
Nazi atrocities, and abuses at home of euthanasia and sterilization.78
Nevertheless, as the Catholic Church seemed increasingly to be
standing alone on questions of sexual and reproductive morality,79 it
became possible for those advocating liberalization to complain that
the "religious beliefs of some should not be forced upon all. "80
Supreme Court Justices warned of "sectarian religious propagandists"

75. P. 214-15 (quoting Letter from Reinhold Niebuhr to Will Scarlett (Jan. 9, 1960)).
76. When my colleague, Tom Shaffer, wrote to the American Civil Liberties Union to
complain that the organization had abandoned the "first principle of secular ethics . . . that
life is an absolute value," the ACLU's director stated in response that he regarded
restrictions on abortion as "an effort to enact theological positions into law." Pp. 260-61
(quoting Letter from Thomas L. Shaffer to John de Pemberton, March 1, 1967; Letter from
John de Pemberton to Thomas L. Shaffer (March 27, 1967)).
77. P. 221 (quoting Fr. John Ford).
78. Pp. 227-28 ("Catholics also reminded American liberals of Nazi enthusiasm for
involuntary sterilization and forced euthanasia, helping to discredit once popular liberal
causes.").
79. By mid-century, Protestant theologians had "almost uniformly rejected natural law
arguments [against] contraception." P. 234. And, on the abortion front, by the late 1960s and
early 1970s, "only Catholics seemed willing to defend restrictions on abortion." P. 261. It
should be noted, however, that evangelical Protestants had, for the most part, long since
retreated from the political arena. Thomas C. Berg, Religious Conservatives and the Death
Penalty, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 31, 48 (2000) (noting that "evangelicals withdrew from
social and political activism during some periods"). See generally, e.g., GEORGE M.
MARSDEN, UNDERSTANDING FuNDAMENTALISM AND EVANGELICALISM (1991); Robert
Wuthnow, The Future of the Religious Right, in No LONGER EXILES 27 (Michael Cromartie
ed., 1993).
80. P. 229. On this point, noted Protestant bioethicist Paul Ramsey "opposed legal
abortion and warned American liberals not to succumb to an 'anti-Catholicism still there
beneath the surface in our generally Protestant culture.' " P. 262. It is telling, perhaps, that
the Southern Baptist Convention hailed Roe v. Wade as "advancing the cause of 'religious
liberty,' " a tribute that "seemed directed at Catholics arrogant enough to presume that their
own views should be law.'' P. 262.
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and the "hazards of religion's intruding into the political arena."81
John Rawls's "suspicion of religious arguments became legal
orthodoxy" {p. 263), and Professor Tribe asserted that Catholic
opposition to abortion represented "efforts to legislate 'religious faith
upon which people will invariably differ widely.' "82
Second, this discussion places in stark relief the central tension
around which the book is organized, namely, the divide between
Catholic and liberal understandings of human freedom: "The Catholic
understanding of the human person clashed with this new liberal
emphasis on autonomy, as well as with the idea that theological
arguments were unacceptable in public debate."83 For many liberals,
influenced perhaps by an increasingly popular European existential
ism, " [t]he substantive outcome of any particular decision . . . mattered
less than protecting the autonomy of the decision-making agent" (p.
253), while prominent Catholic moralists worried about "the modern
tendency to make the 'individual himself [the] sole norm of action
when the chips are down.' "84 In the abortion debate, but also more
generally, "[e]ven as non-Catholic liberals placed more emphasis on
individual autonomy, Catholics were drawn to a different vocabulary.
Solidarity . . . became important not just with the poor but with the
unborn" (p. 272). Charles Taylor's powerful and prescient warning
captures well the Catholic concern: "A romantic view of individual
autonomy, often commingled in the United . States with anti
Catholicism, may weaken the solidarity needed to ensure dignity for
society's most vulnerable members."85
III.
McGreevy's concluding chapter includes a survey of the present
day fallout, both in the Catholic Church and in American politics
more generally, of the rifts that opened during the 1960s and 1970s:
the substantial realignment of Catholic voters as abortion rights
became a fundamental tenet of Democratic Party orthodoxy {pp. 27881. Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 251 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 623 (1971).
82. P. 264 (quoting Laurence H. Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due
Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 21 (1973)).
83. P. 265. Indeed, McGreevy concludes that the "abortion debate shattered [the]
Catholic-liberal rapprochement. Whereas in the 1940s liberals had accused Catholics of
producing citizens incapable of loyalty to American institutions, they now accused Catholics
of refusing to recognize the moral importance of autonomy." Id. Likewise, a century earlier,
abolitionists and "liberal reformers [had) stressed the cultural consequences of Catholicism's
seeming disregard for individual autonomy." P. 13.
84. P. 255 (quoting JOHN C. FORD & GERALD KELLY, 1 CONTEMP. MORAL THEOLOGY
138 (1958)).
85. P . 295 (citing, inter alia, CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF (1989)).
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81, 284, 294); the increasingly salient divisions among American
Catholics on the political, economic, and social implications of
Catholic social teaching (pp. 287-89); and the bracing condemnation
by many Catholic bishops of what John Paul II insisted was a "culture
of death" (pp. 288-89). McGreevy also treats quickly - too quickly,
perhaps - the recent revelations concerning sexual abuse and
misconduct by Catholic priests and the shamefully poor response to it
by many Catholic bishops (pp. 289-93).
Now, it is a truism - but true nonetheless - that what's past is
prologue. And so, these final, "current events" pages are valuable not
so much because they tell us anything new about the state of play in
abortion politics, the clergy-sex-abuse scandals, or intra-Catholic
squabbles, but rather because they confirm and illustrate several
recurring themes in Americans' conversations about Catholicism,
democracy, and freedom. They remind us that, although Catholicism
and American Freedom is billed as "a history," its subject is a
relationship between "two traditions [still] in motion" (p. 15). By
highlighting the salient flashpoints of that relationship over the past
century-and-a-half, McGreevy helps scholars and engaged citizens to
understand its current state and difficulties.
For example: the recent revelations about sexual abuse by Catholic
clergy, and the shocking failure of Catholic leaders and bishops to
respond candidly and charitably to it, have prompted appropriate and
understandable outrage, and also demands for safeguards and
reform.86 No reasonable observer, even if educated about and sensitive
to the past and present reality of anti-Catholicism in American
culture, could blame the Church's current crisis simply on the hostility
or prejudices of the press. And yet, it is hard to deny that, although the
Church's gross failures prompted much sound and measured criticism,
they also gave new life to, and were frequently evaluated in light of,
"venerable anti-Catholic tropes" about authority, hierarchy, celibacy,
and sexuality (p. 290). When a perhaps overwrought Attorney
General of Massachusetts emphasized that the state " 'must' play a
central role in dictating internal governance reforms that the church
'must' adopt,"87 and even presumed to instruct the Church concerning
the selection, training, and ordination of its priests, those familiar with

86. See generally, e.g. , THE BOSTON GLOBE, BETRAYAL: THE CRISIS IN THE CATHOLIC
CHURCH (2002). It should be noted - as Professor Jenkins has shown - that,
notwithstanding the tone and volume of the relevant press coverage, sexual abuse by clergy
is not as widespread as the headlines suggest and also that such abuse is not uniquely, or
even particularly, a Roman Catholic problem. See PHILIP JENKINS. PEDOPHILES AND
PRIESTS (paperback ed., 2001); see also, e.g. , Michael Paulsen & Kevin Cullen, Other
Denominations Report Abuse Charges, BOSTON GLOBE, July 19, 2002, at Al.
87. Harvey Silverglate, Pastors and Prosecutors, WALL ST. J., July 29, 2003, at A14
(citing MASS. ATT'Y GEN. REP., The Sexual Abuse of Children in the Roman Catholic
Archdiocese of Boston (2003), at http://www.ago.state.rna.us/filelibrary/archdiocese.pdf).
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McGreevy's story must have been reminded of that State's earlier
experiments with nunnery inspections (p. 62), if not the investiture
crises of the eleventh and twelfth centuries .88 McGreevy's work gently
but firmly confronts these "tropes," and underscores the long-standing
liberal temptations to exploit myths about Catholic clergy and to
counter through intrusive regulation and supervision the Church's
perceived political and cultural influence. This book should therefore
be of great value to lawyers, legislators, and scholars working to
respond to priests' crimes and bishops' failures in a manner consistent
with religious freedom.89
Similarly, McGreevy's discussion of the early twentieth-century
liberal-Catholic alliance on the "social question" and economic reform
is helpful in assessing present-day discussions about capital
punishment. The evolution during the last few years of America's
death-penalty debate90 - for example, the Supreme Court's decision
in Atkins v. Virginia91, or Governor Ryan's wholescale grant of
clemency to those on death row in lllinois92 - has included the
Catholic Church's highly visible re-examination of capital punishment.
McGreevy discusses, for example, the efforts of Cardinal Joseph
Bernardin and others to articulate a comprehensive "pro-life" ethic,
one in which issues such as abortion, euthanasia, violence, and the
death penalty are linked in a seamless garment (pp. 285-87). And,
prominent Catholics from Sr. Helen Prejean to Pope John Paul II
have become some of the world's leading voices against the death
penalty,93 a fact that is probably curious to those who are conditioned
to regard the Catholic Church as "conservative."
Recall, though, McGreevy's observation that agreement and
concert on the rights of labor, and shared criticisms of laissez faire
capitalism, obscured the fact that Catholic and liberal reformers often
worked from radically different premises (pp. 138, 153-54): that is, the
work and writings of Fr. Ryan and Pope Leo XIII proceeded not from
statist collectivism, ideological hostility to private property, or an
88. See generally, e.g. , HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION 85-119 (1983).
89. See generally, e.g. , Symposium, The Impact of Clergy Sexual Misconduct Litigation
on Religious Liberty, 44 B.C. L. REV. 947 (2003).
90. For one interesting, personal account of this evolution, see, for example, SCOTT
TUROW, ULTIMATE PUNISHMENT (2003).
91. 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (concluding that the Constitution does not permit the imposition
of capital punishment upon "mentally retarded" criminals).
92. On January 23, 2004, the Supreme Court of Illinois agreed that Governor George
Ryan acted within his power when, in January 2003, he commuted the death sentences of
167 inmates and pardoned four others. See People ex rel. Madigan v. Snyder, 804 N.E.2d 546
(Ill. 2004).
93. See, e.g. , HELEN PREJEAN, DEAD MAN WALKING (1993); POPE JOHN PAUL II,
EVANGELIUM VITAE [THE GOSPEL OF LIFE] § 56 (1995). See generally E. CHRISTIAN
BRUGGER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND ROMAN CATHOLIC MORAL TRADITION (2003).
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uncritical embrace of individual autonomy; but rather from distinctly
Catholic claims about work, the family, and the structure of civil
society. Similarly, it is worth remembering today that the Catholic
Church's opposition to capital punishment is built not on moral
relativism or skepticism about the reality of evil and of human agency,
but on fundamental claims about the implications for punishment of
our status as creatures made in the image and likeness of God.94
And, of course, it is hardly possible to avoid the continuity, across
more than 1 50 years, in our arguments about education, religion,
citizenship, and democracy. If the animating aspiration of the
Common School movement and its progeny was the "produc[tion] [of]
citizens worthy of a democratic republic" (p. 38), leading political
theorists today likewise insist that education must be structured and
regulated in a way that renders "liberal citizens . . . capable of their
great office."95 No participant in the contemporary school-choice
arena can help but hear the echoes of earlier liberals' worries about
the destabilizing and anti-democratic effects of Catholicism and
Catholic education. If common-school partisans once saw their
mission as one of liberating children and the Republic's future from
the prejudices and superstitions of Catholicism, some call today for
increased regulation of private and religious education in the name of
children's autonomy96 and the liberal state's commitment to
"conscious social reproduction."97 Again, the dynamics and debates
that McGreevy identifies and explores seem helpful, even essential, to
a well-developed understanding of school vouchers and education
reform, of First Amendment problems involving the "Blaine
Amendments" and "pervasively sectarian" schools,98 and of "civic
education" and political liberalism more generally.99

94. Cf , e.g. , Antonin Scalia, God's Justice and Ours, FIRST THINGS, May 2002, at 17-21
(suggesting that contemporary abolitionism in the West has very little to do with the
influence of Christianity). See generally Richard W. Garnett, Christian Witness, Moral
Anthropology, and the Death Penalty, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 541, 559
(2003) (contending that the "challenge" for Christian believers in the capital-punishment
context is to "propose a truthful vision of the human person as 'the noblest work of God infinitely valuable, relentlessly unique, endlessly interesting,' and to propose that the
question of the death penalty stand or fall on that").
95. MACEDO, supra note 29, at 275; see also id. at ix (noting that public schools are
"instruments for the most basic and controversial of civic ends[,] . . . [t)he project of creating
citizens").
96. See, e.g. , JAMES G. DWYER, RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS V. CHILDREN'S RIGHTS (1998);
cf , e.g., Stephen G. Gilles, Hey, Christians, Leave Your Kids Alone!, 16 CONST. COMMENT.
149 (1999); Michael A. Scaperlanda, Producing Trousered Apes in Dwyer's Totalitarian
State, 7 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 175 (2002).
97.
98.

AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 39, 42 (1987).

See generally, e.g. , Richard W. Garnett, The Theology of the Blaine Amendments,
FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 45 (2003).

2

99. There is a rich scholarly literature on "civic education," and on the challenges posed
by religious faith, teachings, and communities to certain conceptions of political liberalism.
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In addition to these and many other instructive links between
McGreevy's narrative and contemporary questions of policy, several
of the book's themes resonate with provocative developments and
arguments in constitutional law and political theory. For example, as
many scholars have observed (or complained), at the heart of Chief
Justice William Rehnquist's legacy is a version of "federalism" that
emphasizes the connections between the protection and vitality of
individual freedoms and the Constitution's structural features. These
structural features both preserve and clear out the "space" of civil
society in which associations and mediating institutions do their work
of creating norms, forming citizens, and protecting freedom. As
Professor McGinnis has explored in great detail, a powerful and
pervasive theme in the Rehnquist Court's decisions is a recognition,
and even a celebration, of the place in civic life of mediating
associations, their expression, and their diversity. 1 00
It is worth reflecting, then, on the fact that many of the differences
that McGreevy identifies and describes between Catholic and liberal
understandings of "freedom" stem from different understandings of
the relation between individual freedom and autonomy, on the one
hand, and the freedom and autonomy of groups and mediating
institutions, on the other. The claim that, perhaps more than any
other, animates McGreevy's account is that the Catholic view was and
remains less individualistic, and more communal or communitarian,
than the liberal one.101 It should be emphasized, though, that Catholic
social teaching is not reducible to the amorphous "communitarianism"
that is fashionable in many circles, to statist collectivism, or even to
centralization generally. 102 What is distinct about Catholic social
See, e.g., MEIRA LEVINSON, THE DEMANDS OF LIBERAL EDUCATION (1999); MACEDO,
supra note 29; MAKING GOOD CITIZENS: EDUCATION AND CIVIL SOCIETY (Diane Ravitch

& J. Viteritti eds., 2001); NOMOS XLIII: MORAL AND POLITICAL EDUCATION (Stephen
Macedo & Yael Tamir eds., 2002); William Galston, Civic Education in the Liberal State, in
LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE 89 (Nancy Rosenblum ed., 1989); Stephen G. Gilles, On
Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 937 (1996); Michael W.
McConnell, Multiculturalism, Majoritarianism, and Educational Choice: What Does Our
Constitutional Tradition Have to Say?, 1991 CHI. LEGAL F. 123 (1991).
100. See McGinnis, supra note 31, at 526-43; see also Garnett, supra note 31, at 1853-54;
Jason Mazzone, The Social Capital Argument for Federalism, 11 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 27,
27 (2001) (arguing that "[f]ederalism promotes social capital because dividing power
between the national government and the states provides greater opportunities for citizen
groups to influence politics and for individual citizens to participate in public life"). But see,
e.g. , Daniel A. Farber, Speaking in the First Person Plural: Expressive Associations and the
First Amendment, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1483, 1506 (2001) ("Many of America's Founding
Fathers . . . didn't think much of voluntary associations.").
101. See, e.g. , Lacey, supra note 6 (stating that McGreevy "pits a long-sustained but
eroding Catholic communitarian vision of the uses of freedom against a more pervasive,
individualistic view that issued from Protestant doctrines of liberty of conscience and the
rights of private judgment").
102 Cf Stephen M. Bainbridge, Catholic Social Thought and the Corporation 2 (Oct.
22, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
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thought is not simply that it emphasizes "community" rather than
individual "autonomy," but why it emphasizes community.
Accordingly, the principle of "subsidiarity" serves as a bulwark
against both excessive individualism and stultifying centralization.
"Subsidiarity," in a nutshell, is the "principle of limited government"
according to which " [t]he state should do only what cannot effectively
be done by private action, and whenever possible the individual
should make his own decisions."103 Like American federalism, the
principle recognizes the connection between associational freedoms
and the authentic freedom and flourishing of persons.104 However, its
end is not devolution for its own sake, any more than the Catholic
critique of individualism that McGreevy traces supports centralization
for its own sake.105 The Catholic notion of subsidiarity, like Catholics'
assertedly more "communal" orientation, aims ultimately not at the
good of the state, or at the greatest good for the greatest number, but
at the "common good" of persons, i.e., at achieving "those conditions
of social life by which individuals, families, and groups can achieve
their own fulfillment in a relatively thorough and ready way."106 Thus,
the different ideas of "freedom" running through McGreevy's account
are not reducible to the claim that "liberals talk about the individual,
while Catholics talk about community." Yes, as McGreevy describes,
"Catholics talk about community," but this is because of its asserted
connection to human "freedom." After all, the authentic freedom of

461100). (criticizing the "persistent error" in the "collectivist moral strain" of many writing
in the tradition of Catholic social teaching). Indeed, as McGreevy observes, the "reluctance
of nineteenth-century Catholics to view the nation-state as the end of human history now
seems prescient." P. 294.
103. David P. Currie, Subsidiarity, 1 2D SER. GREEN BAG 359, 359 n.1 (1997); see also
Pope John Paul II, Centissimus annus [Encyclical Letter on the Hundredth Anniversary of
Rerum novarum) 'l[ 48 (1991) (noting that subsidiarity is the principle according to which "a
community of a higher order should not interfere in the internal life of a community of a
lower order, depriving the latter of its functions, but rather should support it in case of need
and help to co-ordinate its activity with the activities of the rest of society, always with a view
to the common good,"); Mary Ann Glendon, Civil Service, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 1, 1996, at
39, 40 ("Subsidiarity [is) the principle of leaving social tasks to the smallest social unit that
can perform them adequately.") (reviewing MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S
DISCONTENT (1996)).
104. This is not to say that subsidiarity is entirely co-extensive with American
federalism, or vice versa. See generally Robert K. Vischer, Subsidiarity as a Principle of
Governance: Beyond Devolution, 35 IND. L. REV. 103 (2001) [hereinafter Vischer,

Subsidiarity as a Principle of Goverance].

105. Vischer, Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance, supra note 104, at 116
("Subsidiarity is not a knee-jerk shunning of government authority . . . . Rather, subsidiarity
is a principled tendency toward solving problems at the local level and empowering
individuals, families and voluntary associations to act more efficaciously in their own lives.").
106. Pope Paul VI, Gaudium et spes, in THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II 283-84
(Joseph Gallagher trans., Walter M. Abbott ed. 1 966). See Richard W. Garnett, Common
Schools and the Common Good: Reflections on the School-Choice Debate, 75 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 219 (2001).
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persons is no less fundamental to Catholic thinking than it has been to
the liberal tradition.107 McGreevy performs a valuable service in
pushing us to realize that the Catholic tradition in America has not so
much opposed freedom as proposed a different kind of freedom, or as Professor Rodes puts it, "a deeper understanding of freedom."108
Also running through both of these traditions is an argument about
Catholics' loyalty. The "Catholic problem," in the imagination of
American liberals, has often been conceived in terms of loyalty to
democracy, to nation, and - more recently - to autonomy-based
morality.109 The charge, in Murray's words, has been that "You are
among us but you are not of us."110 It is no longer (as it once was) that
Catholics' political allegiances might lie in Rome, or with Italy or
Spain, but rather that they ostentatiously, and increasingly
anomalously, dissent from what are widely regarded as foundational
normative premises. On this point, Professor Carter's 1995 Massey
Lectures provide a provocative meditation on the competing demands
of "loyalty" made by the state and by mediating associations, including
religious communities, and also on the state's efforts to instill such
loyalty via education and other means.111 It is important to recognize,
Carter reminds us, that religious traditions seek to "project into the
future an understanding of the world that may be quite different from
that of the sovereign majority of . . . citizens."112 It is because they
"demand forms of allegiance and thus of loyalty"113 that their claims
pose an obstacle to what Carter calls the "project of liberal

·
107. See, e.g. , Bainbridge, supra note 102, at 1 ("If a concern for human freedom is not
at the center of Catholic social teaching, it is at least very near.").
108. ROBERT E. RODES, JR., PILGRIM LAW 13 (1998) (noting that "(i]n a good deal of
medieval thought, freedom is seen as the power of a created being to move without
hindrance in the way God intended").
109. As McGreevy puts it, discussing European anti-clericalism, "(p]articular targets . . .
were the men's religious orders, precisely because members of the orders emphasized loyalty
to the pope above national allegiance." P. 21. He notes also that many American liberals
cheered Bismarck's Kulturkampf, and nodded when Gladstone insisted that "British
Catholics could [not] simultaneously be loyal to the papacy and to the nation." P. 98.
1 10. MURRAY, supra note 16, at 20 ("The neo-Nativist . . . addresses to the Catholic
[this] charge: 'You are among us but you are not of us.' . . . To this charge the Catholic . . .
will politely reply that this is Jacobinism, noveau style, and that Jacobinism, any style, is out
of style in this day and age.'').
111. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE DISSENT OF THE GOVERNED (1998).
1 12 Id. at 141; id. at 30 ("(A] principal purpose of religious narrative and religious
observance is to preserve the tradition of the past and project it into the future."); id. at 27
("(T]he meanings that they discover and assign to the world may be radically distinct from
those that are assigned by the political sovereign."). See also, e.g. , Charles Taylor, Religion in
a Free Society, in ARTICLES OF FAITH, ARTICLES OF PEACE 93, 100 (James Davison Hunter
& Os Guinness eds., 1990) ("(T]he Christian church gave its members a universal allegiance,
which could easily conflict with, or at least rival their political ties.'').
1 13. Carter, supra note 111, at 29-30.
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constitutionalism,"114 which includes an effort to "create[] a single,
nationwide community with shared values and shared, enforceable
understandings of how local communities of all descriptions should be
organized. "115
But if McGreevy's analysis of the relationship between American
liberalism and Catholicism reveals a pattern of concern about the
compatibility of the latter with the former, i.e., about the problem of
Catholic dissent from liberal autonomy, there are also those who
object to American Catholics' excessive accommodations to America
and American freedom. Although Catholicism and American Freedom
is a work of history, not advocacy, it seems fair to read McGreevy as
broadly sympathetic to the Brownson/Murray project of situating
Catholicism within the American consensus, of framing America's
ends and ideals as consistent with Catholicism, and of searching for
and emphasizing a fundamental harmony between Catholicism and
the United States. Today, as before, arguments persist over the
feasibility, and integrity, of that project.
My colleague, Professor Michael Baxter, along with theologian
Stanley Hauerwas, has argued that the American set of "political
arrangements" "present[s] a deep and intractable challenge" for "that
community whose allegiance is first and foremost to the Kingship of
Christ."116 It is widely supposed, B axter and Hauerwas observe, that a
"central purpose" of those arrangements "is the subordination of
religion to the political order, meaning the primacy of democracy."117
Thus, "in their embrace of the American experiment, Catholics have
learned to adapt to a political landscape marked by religious
indifferentism. "118 In B axter's view, the appropriate, authentic
response to doubts about Catholics' loyalty is not irenicism, but
irresolution.119 Certainly, this is a controversial position, and it is not
obviously a weakness in McGreevy's book that he fails to endorse it.
The point here is simply that our public conversations about law,
religion, citizenship, and loyalty would be improved if their

114. Id. at 29.
115. Id. at 19.
116. Stanley Hauerwas & Michael Baxter, C.S.C., The Kingship of Christ: Why Freedom
of"Belief' ls Not Enough, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 107, 107 ( 1992).
117. Id. at 109 (quoting George F. Will, Conduct, Coercion, Belief, WASH. POST, Apr.
22, 1990, at B7).
118. Id. at 120. See generally, e.g. , ALAN WOLFE, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN RELIGION (2003).
119. Id. at 127 (noting that the life of Father Max Josef Metzger - a former German
Army chaplain who became a peace activist - "demonstrates that 'making peace' with the
polities of this world is not the first task of a Church that worships Christ the King.").
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participants acquired a greater sensitivity to the matter of religious
believers' competing loyalties.12°
Finally, as was just mentioned, running through this book is a claim
that Catholic morality and political theory are more communitarian
than individualistic, solidaristic than atomistic, and so on. This is a
claim, however, that goes deeper than claims about how societies,
governments, and economies should be organized. Even more
important is the fact that Catholicism proposes a moral anthropology
that is at odds with the one proposed by liberalism, and that this
deeper difference is at the heart of the dynamic explored in this
book.1 21 That is, a fundamental, different claim about what the human
being is and is for spins off the various disagreements about what
government can, should, and should not do.
Now, by "moral anthropology," I mean "an account of what it is
about the human person that does the work in moral arguments about
what we ought or ought not to do and about how we ought or ought
not to be treated."122 In the Psalmist's words, "Lord, what is
man . . . that thou makest account of him?"123 This is not only a prayer,
but a starting point for jurisprudential reflection. After all, as John
Courtney Murray once observed, " [i]n the end, every structure of
moral doctrine and decision rests on a concept of the nature of
man."124 All moral problems are anthropological problems, because
moral arguments are built, for the most part, on anthropological
presuppositions.125
For a recent example of anthropological reflection in the service of
jurisprudential argument, consider a recent article by Professor Steven
120. In a similar vein, my colleague and teacher, Tom Shaffer, commented to me that
these conversations - and perhaps also McGreevy's own account - would be enriched by
paying greater attention to the experiences and communities of the later Catholic
immigrants. See generally THOMAS L. SHAFFER & MARY SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS
AND THEIR COMMUNITIES (1991).
121. See, e.g. , Richard John Neuhaus, An Argument About Human Nature, in A NEW
WORLDLY ORDER 132 (George Weigel ed., 1992).
122. Richard W. Garnett, Christian Witness, Moral Anthropology, and the Death
Penalty, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHI CS & PUB. POL'Y 541, 543 (2003).
123. Psalms 143:3 (King James).
124. MURRAY, supra note 16, at 296; id. at 126 ("The basic question that modernity has
come to, of course, is what is man?").
125. As Professor Elshtain has put it, our attempts at moral judgment tend to reflect our
foundational assumptions about what it means to be human. Jean Bethke Elshtain, The
Dignity of the Human Person and the Idea of Human Rights: Four Inquiries, 14 J.L. &
RELIGION 53 (1999-2000). My colleague John Coughlin has noted that the "anthropological
question" is both "perennial" and profound: "What does it mean to be a human being?"
John J. Coughlin, Law and Theology: Reflections on What it Means to Be Human, 74 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 609, 609 (2000); Steven D. Smith, Believing Persons, Personal Believings:
The Neglected Center of the First Amendment, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1233, 1235 [hereinafter
Smith, Believing Persons] ("(E]very body of Jaw and legal discourse will necessarily embrace
some conception, or perhaps multiple conceptions, of the person.").

·
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Smith, in which he "addresses how our conception of what it means to
be a person influences First Amendment law. " 126 In his view, our law
generally, and our First Amendment doctrine in particular, have
"suffered by embracing conceptions of the person ill-advisedly
imported from other disciplines or philosophical perspectives" and
would "be strengthened and enriched by a more self-conscious
recognition of . . . 'the person as believer.' "1 27 What is more, Smith
contends, a law of religious freedom - or, more generally, a theory of
political community - that proceeded from a "believer"-based
anthropology would contrast markedly, and in important ways, from
one that rested, say, on Rawlsian political liberalism, which
encourages, and even requires, the radical privatization of religion.1 28
Smith's argument is important and provocative, and this is not the
place for a detailed account or response. It is enough here to suggest
that the kinds of examinations and reflections proposed and
undertaken by Smith are promising, and that McGreevy's history
should assist them by showing how one particular set of arguments
and experiences across time has been shaped not simply by different
notions of "freedom," but also by different views of who and what we
really are who struggle for it.
CONCLUSION

The word "religion" comes from religare, which means to "tie fast"
or bind together.129 And yet, many today appear to regard religion's
purported capacity - even tendency - to "divide" as its near
defining feature. 1 30 True, few epithets in contemporary discourse are
as biting, yet as tedious and vacuous, as the charge that a person,
claim, argument, proposal, or belief is "divisive.'' The term - like
"controversial" and "partisan" - often seems to do little more than
signal the speaker's disapproval, and her desire that the offending
target either be quiet, or change her tune. Nevertheless, American
society is, we are told time and again, fractured, split, partisan; it is,
about many things and in many ways, "divided." We are, Gertrude
126. Smith, Believing Persons, supra note 125, at 1233.
127. Id. at 1235; id. at 1241 ("[T]he believing person is central to First Amendment
commitments and . . . First Amendment jurisprudence has suffered by neglecting this central
concern.").
128. Id. at 1284-85.
129. The Middle French derivative is relier, "to connect, fasten together." WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2002) (entry for "religion").
130. Cf John C. Danforth, Leaders Can Find Unity in What Divides Us, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 10, 2002, at B3 ("The root meaning of the word suggests that religion
is supposed to bind us together. If this is so, then those 'religions' that are divisive should be
called by another name. To call a belief that is designed to be a wedge a religion is deceptive
to the point of being fraudulent.").
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Himmelfarb contends, " One Nation, two cultures."131 What is more, it
is difficult to avoid the impression that social and political fault lines
trace, even if they do not clearly result from, religious differences and
disagreements. " [T]here is," several researchers have concluded, "a
new religious order in American electoral politics, one characterized
not only by the distinctive partisanship of religious traditions, but also
by theological polarization within the nation's three largest tradi
tions."132 These divisions should not be overstated, but they are real.133
Catholicism and American Freedom opens and closes with
divisions, both in the American political community and in the Roman
Catholic Church.134 Certainly, McGreevy does not celebrate these
divisions. Nevertheless, one of this book's many lessons might be that,
in the end, we should "cherish only modest expectations with regard
to the solution of the problem of religious pluralism and civic unity."135
At the same time, this work offers the attractive, unifying hope that as
the "long Catholic encounter with American ideas of freedom"
continues, all will come to appreciate "that associations and ties with
the strangers in our midst satisfy our deepest, most common
aspirations" (p. 295).

131. See also, e.g. , GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, ONE NATION, Two CULTURES (2001);
David Brooks, One Nation, Slightly Divisible, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 2001, at 86; see
also STANLEY B . GREENBERG, THE Two AMERICAS (2004).
132. James L. Guth et al., America Fifty/Fifty, FIRST THINGS, Oct. 2001, at 19 (noting
that "[r]eligion played a key role in determining both the partisan polarization and the
disengagement that characterized the public in 2000"); News Release: The Pew Forum on
Religion & Pub. Life, Religion and Politics: Contention and Consensus 1 (July 24, 2003)
("Religion is a critical factor these days in the public's thinking about contentious policy
issues and political matters.").
133. But see, e.g. , ALAN WOLFE, ONE NATION, AFTER ALL (1998).
134. The Eliot School Rebellion, remember, involved Catholic dissent from compulsory
recitation of the King James Bible, a text that reflected, among other things, a rejection of
the "Puritan error" of "social divisiveness." NICOLSON, supra note 34, at 90; see also id. at
121 (noting that radical Puritans were excluded from the company of translators because
"[t]he heart of their thinking was divisive, not part of the unifying national project").
135. MURRAY, supra note 16, at 23.

